Introduction
Optimal monetary policy analyses (Khan et al., 2003; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, SGU henceforth, 2004a) identify two-key frictions driving the optimal level of long-run (or trend) in ‡ation. The …rst one is the adjustment cost of goods prices, which invariably drives the optimal in ‡ation rate to zero. The second one are monetary transaction costs that arise unless the central bank implements the Friedman rule, i.e. a negative steady-state in ‡ation rate as long as the steadystate real interest rate is positive. In their survey of the literature, SGU (2011) argue that the optimality of zero in ‡ation is robust to other frictions, such as nominal wage adjustment costs, downward wage rigidity, hedonic prices, the existence of an untaxed informal sector, the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. This latter result is broadly con…rmed by Coibion et al. (2012) , who …nd that the optimal in ‡ation rate is low, typically less than two percent, even when the economy is hit by costly but infrequent episodes at the zero-lower bound. A consensus therefore seems to exist that monetary transactions costs are relatively small at zero in ‡ation, and that implementing low and stable in ‡ation is the proper policy.
This theoretical result is in sharp contrast with empirical evidence. For instance, both in the US and in the Euro area, average in ‡ation rates over the 1970-1999 period have been close to 5%. Even the widespread central bank practice of adopting in ‡ation targets between 2% and 4% is apparently at odds with theories of the optimal in ‡ation rate (SGU, 2011) .
Furthermore, following the build up of large stocks of debt in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis, some economists have argued that the public debt surge should be reversed and that a temporary increase in in ‡ation might be necessary to achieve this goal. For instance Rogo¤ (2010) suggests that "two or three years of slightly elevated in ‡ation strikes me as the best of many very bad options." Blanchard et al. (2010) point at the potential role of the in ‡ation tax as one among several distortionary taxes which are available to policymakers. Aizenman and Marion (2009) predict that a 6% in ‡ation rate would reduce the debt/GDP ratio by 20 percent within 4 years. These contributions are in line with the well known Phelps (1973) argument that to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation it might be optimal for governments to resort to monetary …nancing, driving a wedge between the private and the social cost of money.
The Phelps argument has been widely investigated in the framework of general equilibrium models, and never found su¢ cient to warrant the optimality of a signi…cantly positive in ‡ation rate. The …rst result obtained in this literature is that, in a world of ‡exible prices, distortionary taxation does not warrant deviations from the Friedman rule unless factor incomes are suboptimally taxed (see SGU 2011 and references cited therein). The underlying intuition is that since all resources are eventually used for consumption, then the in ‡ation tax, which a¤ects consumption transaction costs, is desirable only to the extent that other taxes have a suboptimal e¤ect on consumption. The second important result is that when the goods market characterization is modi…ed to account for (suboptimally taxed) monopolistic distortions and nominal rigidities, numerical simulations suggest that the optimal in ‡ation rate lies between the Friedman rule and zero even accounting for the Phelps'e¤ect (SGU 2004a) . This conclusion carries over to the optimality of near-zero volatility of in ‡ation and near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates in response to shocks, implying that the recent increase of public debt in developed economies should be regarded as a tax smoothing device in response to the …nancial crisis.
Our paper reconsiders the importance of the Phelps'e¤ect and obtains results that challenge previous theoretical results. We show that a non-negligible in ‡ation rate might indeed be optimal and that in ‡ation (and tax rates) volatility should be exploited in order to stabilize debt/GDP ratios in the long run.
The starting point in our analysis is that the optimal zero in ‡ation result ob-tained in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with nominal rigidities depends on the incentives of raising revenues from in ‡ation or the labor income tax, but such incentives depend on both size and composition of public expenditure. In the literature, standard calibrations of public expenditures focus on public consumption-to-GDP ratios, typically set at 20% (SGU, 2004a; Aruoba and Schorfeide, 2011) . This follows a long-standing tradition in business cycle models, where only public consumption decisions have real e¤ects. In our framework this choice is not correct, because the focus here is on distortionary …nancing of public expenditures in steady state, where also other components of public expenditure matter. As a matter of fact, public consumption accounts for a limited component of the overall public expenditures in OECD countries (Table 1) . 
* averarge ratios to GDP -Source OECD Even if a proportion of total expenditures goes into production subsidies, it is apparent that distortionary taxation substantially exceeds public consumption, in order to …nance redistributive policies. For instance in the US, according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data, in the 1998-2008 period government transfer payments and government purchases respectively were close to 12% and 15% of GDP. Oh and Reis (2011) document that between 2008 and 2009 three quarters of the US huge …scal stimulus in response to the …nancial crisis were due to increases in transfers.
We show that just allowing for a plausible parameterization of public transfers to households in the SGU (2004a) model reverses their conclusion about the optimal in ‡ation rate, which now monotonically increases from 2% to 12% as the transfers-to-GDP ratio goes from 10% to 20%. We also …nd that an identical increase in the public-consumption-to-GDP ratio would have a negligible impact on the optimal in ‡ation rate. So, what is special about public transfers? The answer to this question is that permanent changes in public consumption and transfers di¤erently a¤ect in steady state the planner's ability to raise revenues through in ‡ation. In fact, for any given level of the tax and in ‡ation rates, an increase in public consumption causes a fall in private consumption and in real money balances, eroding the in ‡ation tax base. By contrast, a coeteris paribus increase in public transfers has no e¤ect on public consumption and real money balances. As a result incentives to choose in ‡ation and the tax rate depend on the ability of raising revenues through the two instruments and on the distortions imposed on the economy. Taking into account that both policy tools are associated to La¤er curves, this explains why the optimal …nancing mix gradually shifts towards stronger reliance on in ‡ation when transfers become relatively large.
We also investigate the optimal …scal and monetary policy responses to shocks. The issue is admittedly not new, but we are able to provide new contributions to the literature. When prices are ‡exible and governments issue non-contingent nominal debt (Chari et al., 1991) , it is optimal to use in ‡ation as a lump-sum tax on nominal wealth, and the highly volatile in ‡ation rate allows to smooth taxes over the business cycle. This result is intuitive in so far as taxes are distortionary whereas in ‡ation volatility is costless. SGU (2004a) show that when price adjustment is costly optimal in ‡ation volatility is in fact minimal and long-run debt adjustment allows to obtain tax-smoothing over the business cycle. In our paper the SGU result is reversed even when the amount of public transfers is relatively small (12% of GDP). In this case tax and in ‡ation volatility are exploited to limit debt adjustment in the long run.
The interpretation of this result is simple. As discussed above, public transfers increase the tax burden in steady state. In this case, the accumulation of debt in the face of an adverse shock -which would work as a tax smoothing device in SGU (2004a) -is less desirable, because it would further increase long-run distortions. To avoid such distortions, the policymaker is induced to front-load …scal adjustment, and to in ‡ate away part of the real value of outstanding nominal debt. Consumption smoothing is therefore reduced relative to SGU (2004a) To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst study of the optimal interaction between in ‡ation and tax policies when transfers account for the relatively large proportion of public expenditures that is documented in the data. A number of recent papers have analyzed the macroeconomic implications of public transfer schemes, but their focus is di¤erent from ours. Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) investigate the labour supply response and the welfare implications of an optimal public transfer scheme in the context of a model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, incomplete …nancial markets and ‡exible prices. Oh and Reis (2011) analyze the role of transfers for consumption stabilization in the context of heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets and sticky prices -when taxes are lump-sum, no public debt accumulation is allowed and the central bank is constrained to implement a zero-in ‡ation policy. Angelopoulos et al. (2007) maintain the representative agent hypothesis and incorporate an uncoordinated redistributive struggle for transfers into an otherwise standard DSGE model. Zubairy (2010) investigates the consequences of temporary public transfer shocks in an estimated representative agent DSGE model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 introduces the Ramsey policy and illustrates our main results. Section 4 discusses optimal monetary and …scal stabilization poli-cies. Section 5 concludes.
The model
We consider a simple in…nite-horizon production economy populated by a continuum of households and …rms whose total measures are normalized to one. Monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities characterize product markets. The labor market is competitive. A demand for money is motivated by assuming that money facilitates transactions. The government …nances an exogenous stream of expenditures by levying distortionary labor income taxes and by printing money. Optimal policy is set according to a Ramsey plan. Right from the outset, it should be noted that the focus here is on the identi…cation of the optimal …nancing mix for exogenous levels of public expenditures, including both consumption and transfers.
Households
The representative household (i) maximizes the following utility function
where 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount rate, c t;
is a consumption bundle, l t;i denotes the individual labor supply. The consumption price index is
. The ‡ow budget constraint in period t is given by
where w t;i is the real wage; t is the labor income tax rate; T t denotes …scal transfers; t are …rms pro…ts; R t is the gross nominal interest rate, B t;i is a nominally riskless bond that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1. M t;i de…nes nominal money holdings to be used in period t + 1 in order to facilitate consumption purchases. Consumption purchases are subject to a transaction cost
where v t;i = Pt;ict;i Mt;i is the household's consumption-based money velocity. The features of s(v t;i ) are such that a satiation level of money velocity (v > 0) exists where the transaction cost vanishes and, simultaneously, a …nite demand for money is associated to a zero nominal interest rate. Following SGU (2004a) the transaction cost is parameterized as
The …rst-order conditions of the household's maximization problem are:
Equation (5) is the demand for the good j. As in SGU (2004a) condition (6) states that the transaction cost introduces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth that vanishes only if v = v . Equation (7) is a standard Euler condition where t+1 = P t+1 =P t denotes the gross in ‡ation rate. Equation (8) de…nes the individual labor supply condition and t = 1+s(vt)+vts 0 (vt) 1 t denotes the policy wedge, which depends on both tax and in ‡ation decisions. Finally, equation (9) implicitly de…nes the money demand function, such that
Firms'pricing decisions
Each …rm (j) produces a di¤erentiated good using the production function:
where z t denotes a productivity shock. 5 2 Our results are robust to the alternative speci…cation for the transaction cost used by Brock (1989) and Kimbrough (2006) , which implies a Cagan (1956) money demand function. A proof is available upon request. The model is also compatible with Baumol (1952) demand for money (see SGU, 2004a) .
3 When solving its optimization problem, the household takes as given goods and bond prices. As usual, we also assume that the household is subject to a solvency constraint that prevents him from engaging in Ponzi schemes. 4 We abstract from capital accumulation and assume constant returns to scale of employed labor. The consequences of these two assumptions are discussed in SGU (2006) and SGU (2011) respectively. Our results are not a¤ected by the introduction of diminishing returns to scale for labor (simulation results available upon request). 5 We assume that ln zt follows an AR(1) process.
We assume a sticky price speci…cation based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment:
where p > 0 is a measure of price stickiness. In line with Ascari et al. (2011) , we assume that the re-optimization cost is proportional to output.
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In a symmetrical equilibrium the price adjustment rule satis…es:
where
From (5) it would be straightforward to show that 1 = p de…nes the price markup that obtains under ‡exible prices.
Government budget and aggregate resource constraints
The government supplies an exogenous, stochastic and unproductive amount of public good G t and implements exogenous transfers T t . Government …nancing is obtained through a labor-income tax, money creation and issuance of oneperiod, nominally risk free bonds. The government's ‡ow budget constraint is then given by
The aggregate resource constraint closes the model:
Ramsey policy
The Ramsey policy is a set of plans fC t ; l t ; t ; mc t ; t ; v t ; R t ; t g +1 t=0 that maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (i.e., (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14), (15)) and the exogenous stochastic process driving the …scal and technology shocks. Solution requires numerical simulations. 8 The time unit is meant to be a year; we set the subjective discount rate to 0:96 to be consistent with a steady-state real rate of return of 4 percent per year; following SGU, transaction cost parameters A and B are set at 0:011 and 0:075, the debt-to-GDP ratio (B=Y ) is set at 0:44 percent, in the goods market monopolistic competition implies a gross markup of 1:2, and the annualized Rotemberg price adjustment cost is 4:375 (this implies that …rms change 6 Our results are independent of this assumption A proof is available upon request. 7 As in SGU (2004a), ln gt, gt = Gt=Yt, is assumed to evolve exogenously following an independent AR(1) process. We assume instead that the level of the real transfer is non stochastic.
8 These are obtained implementing SGU (2004b) second order appoximation routines.
their price on average every 9 months, see SGU, 2004a: 210) . The preference parameter is set so that in the ‡exible-price steady state households allocate 20 percent of their time to work.
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In Figure 1 we describe the optimal in ‡ation response in steady state to the transfer increase and to a corresponding variation in public consumption beyond the values assumed in SGU (2004a) calibrations. Simulations show that steady state in ‡ation rapidly increases when T =Y grows beyond the 8% threshold. For instance, the optimal in ‡ation rate is close to 3% when T =Y is 10%, and exceeds 13% when the transfer ratio is 20%. Simulations also show that in the case where public expenditure is con…ned to public consumption, optimal in ‡ation would exceed 5% only for G=Y > 35%. The same pattern obtains when we replicate the same exercise assuming ‡exible prices but the absence of price adjustment costs induces the policymaker to choose higher in ‡ation rates.
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To understand these results it is necessary to analyze how, for given levels of and , permanent changes in public expenditures di¤erently a¤ect in steady state the planner's ability to raise revenues either through the labor-income tax, W P l , or through in ‡ation
9 This is computed in the ‡exible price equilibrium, when the public consumption-to-GDP (G=Y ) ratio is 0:20 and public transfers are nil (T =Y = 0). For the sake of comparision, we calibrate our model as SGU (2004a). 1 0 Results available upon request.
where R = . From (7), (8), (15), it is straightforward to show that
and
where w = + p ( 1) (1 ) (1 ). Thus an increase in public consumption is associated to a fall in private consumption and to an increase in the labor supply. The reduction in private consumption is associated to a fall in real money holdings, that is, to a reduction in the in ‡ation tax base. By contrast, revenues from the labor income tax increase due to the labor supply expansion. In fact the elasticities of in ‡ation and labor tax revenues with respect to G,
respectively fall and increase in G. Thus it not surprising that an increase in public consumption is not associated to an increase in in ‡ation. The above result carries over to a di¤erent speci…cation of the utility function, such as the Greenwood-Hercowitz-Hu¤man (1988) (GHH, henceforth) preferences GHH u (C t;i ; l t;i ) = C t;i l
In this case the marginal rate of substitution
uc(ct;lt) = l t;i is independent of consumption, i.e. there is no wealth e¤ect on the labour supply, and labor market equilibrium condition in steady state is l t;i = w. It follows that GHH G = 0, because @l t =@G t = 0. For the same reason, however, under (21) the increase in public consumption is associated to a larger fall in consumption and real money holdings than under (1). As a result we obtain that
Simulations con…rm that under GHH preferences an increase in public consumption is met by an expansion in the labor tax whereas in ‡ation remains very close to zero.
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The di¤erent in ‡ation response to an increase in public transfers is now more easily understood. In fact in this case T = T = 0. As a result incentives to choose in ‡ation and the labor income tax depend on the ability of raising revenues and on the distortions imposed on the economy. Note that both policy tools are associated to La¤er curves. In addition in ‡ation has a distortionary e¤ect on monetary transactions and imposes a price adjustment cost on …rms.
It is interesting to compare our interpretation of the in ‡ationary outcome generated by the need to …nance transfers with the one o¤ered by SGU (2006: 385) . In fact, they claim that when the private sector must receive an exogenous amount of (after-tax) transfers, it is optimal to exploit the in ‡ation tax on money balances in order to impose an indirect levy on the (transfers-determined) source of household income. In our view this claim is not correct. In fact, the incentive to choose a positive in ‡ation rate arises because taxes are distortionary and, as shown above, …nancing transfers by means of in ‡ation is profoundly di¤erent from …nancing an equivalent amount of public consumption. Thus the Ramsey planner chooses a positive in ‡ation rate in order to limit output distortions and consumption losses. In Figure 2 below we show the consumption responses to di¤erent transfer ratios when in ‡ation is zero and when it is chosen optimally. Our interpretation of the reason why a su¢ ciently large amount of transfers calls for a positive in ‡ation di¤ers from the one presented in SGU (2006: 397) , and is a novel contribution of the paper. As discussed by SGU (2011), positive in ‡ation may be a desirable instrument if some part of income is suboptimally taxed.
12 In our framework this implies that the choice of in ‡ating the economy depends on monopolistic distortions in the goods market. In fact, when p = 1:1 optimal in ‡ation remains close to zero for T =Y 15% (Figure 3 ). 
Optimal monetary and …scal stabilization policies
In this section we investigate whether our characterization of steady-state public expenditures also bears implications for the conduct of macroeconomic policies over the business cycle. SGU (2004a) show that, when public transfers are nil, costly price adjustment induces the Ramsey planner to choose a minimal amount of in ‡ation volatility and to select a permanent public debt response to shocks in order to smooth taxes over the business cycle. Benigno and Woodford (2004) , who emphasize the complementarity between …scal and monetary policies, substantially con…rm the optimality of near-zero in ‡ation volatility for a plausible amount of nominal price stickiness. We discuss how the optimal …scal and monetary stabilization policies 13 change when in steady state T =Y is 0:12 instead of zero, other …scal …gures are assumed to be G=Y = 0:17 14 and B=Y = 0:44. 15 In Table 2 we show that in this latter case the volatility of both taxes and in ‡ation dramatically increases whereas the strong persistence of taxes vanishes. 16 Thus, even if we still obtain a unit root in the dynamic process for debt accumulation, a more 1 3 We consider a productivity and a public consumption shock. Properties of stochastic processes are described in Table 2 . We compute the second-order approximation using SGU (2004b) routines (See also SGU 2004a: Section 7).
1 4 SGU (2004a) calibrate G=Y = 0:2. This does not a¤ect our results. Note that our assumption about G=Y is more adverse in supporting any Phelps'e¤ect.
1 5 Our calibration is consistent with US data. Averages are obtained considering the period 1990-2012, but they are rather stable (see also Klein et al., 2005) . Later we will explore the e¤ects of larger real debts, in line with the increase observed in the aftermath of the …nancial crisis, and di¤erent assumptions about public consumption expenditure.
1 6 To sharpen the analysis we assume the shock is not serially correlated.
realistic calibration of …scal outlays has important implications for the dynamic pattern of …scal and monetary stabilization policies. To grasp intuition consider the impulse response functions to a 3% (one standard deviation) increase in government purchases (Figure 4) . Under both scenarios the permanent debt adjustment allows to smooth tax distortions. However, the di¤erent magnitudes of the permanent debt and tax adjustments associated to the two cases (T =Y = 0 and T =Y = 0:12) are also evident. When T =Y = 0:12, the long-run debt adjustment is reduced by 75%. In this case long-run tax and in ‡ation distortions are already relatively large, and the accumulation of debt in the face of an adverse shock becomes less desirable. Instead, the planner …nds it optimal to front-load tax adjustment and to in ‡ate away part of the real value of outstanding nominal debt. 17 In addition, the increase in in ‡ation positively impacts on seigniorage revenues. This explains the surge in in ‡ation volatility reported in Table 2 . Our model is also able to match the positive empirical correlation between average in ‡ation and in ‡ation variability.
18 Table 2 19 -Dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation (2nd or. approx.) mean st. dev. auto. (a 3% increase in g). The shock takes place in period 1. Public debt, consumption, and output are measured in percent deviations from their pre-shock levels. The tax rate, the nominal interest rate, and the in ‡ation rate are measured in percentage points.
In Figure 5 we present the IRFs obtained when total government outlays in steady state are as high as in the case discussed in Figure 4 (29% of GDP), but T =Y = 0. This allows to disentangle the composition and level e¤ects of steady state …scal outlays. It is easy to see that when T =Y = 0 debt accumulation is much increased, the short run in ‡ation response is close to the SGU case, and the short-run tax response is de…nitely milder. Bearing in mind that steady state in ‡ation is 0:5% when T =Y = 0 and about 2% when T =Y = 0:12, one might argue that the smaller steady-state proceedings from the in ‡ation tax when G=Y = 0:29 induce the Ramsey planner to choose a steady state characterized by a relatively large debt accumulation and a higher tax rate. To further assess the robustness of our results we consider the impulse response functions at di¤erent steady state values of public debt when G=Y = 0:17, T =Y = 0:12 ( Figure 6 ). It is easy to see that di¤erent debt-to-GDP ratios do not a¤ect the adjustment paths of consumption and output, but the long run accumulation of debt is much limited when debt is already relatively large (B=Y = 0:64). This happens because the debt de ‡ating e¤ect of the initial increase in in ‡ation is by far more powerful than when B=Y = 0:44. Finally, in Figure 7 we present the IRFs when monetary transaction costs are virtually nil. In this case front-loading adjustment is preferable, and the accumulation of public debt in the long run is greatly reduced. Relative to the benchmark case presented in Figure 4 , we now observe a stronger reliance on surprise in ‡ation as a tool to reduce debt service payment. In addition, the policy wedge t in (8) is lower for any given in ‡ation rate, providing leeway for the stronger tax increase that we observe in Figure 8 . Finally, the immediate consumption fall is now milder because in ‡ation no longer drives a wedge between wealth and consumption. 
Conclusions
Incompleteness of the tax system is a necessary condition for the existence of a public …nance justi…cation for in ‡ation. The strong point of SGU (2004a SGU ( , 2011 was to argue that irrespective of the incompleteness of the tax system, optimal in ‡ation should be between zero and the Friedman rule. The point of this paper is to show that for the same incompleteness of the tax system a non-negligible in ‡ation rate in steady state is indeed optimal if one adopts a realistic calibration for …scal outlays, including transfers. Di¤erently from SGU (2011), who argue that central bank in ‡ation targets are too high, our contribution shows that a 2% target might indeed be too low, at least for countries where the burden of taxation is rather high, such as those of continental Europe. However, to obtain an empirically relevant assessment of the optimal in ‡ation rate the model should be extended to account for a number of country-speci…c factors, such as governments'ability to optimally tax factor incomes, composition of public expenditures, monetary transaction costs, other frictions such as nominal wage stickiness and indexation, the existence of an informal sector. All this should be done bearing in mind that the tax system incompleteness probably is an inherent feature of modern economies. Similar considerations can be made concerning in ‡ation costs. For instance, Calvo pricing, which implies price dispersion, might generate higher in ‡ation costs than Rotemberg pricing, but one should also take into account in ‡ation indexation and its correlation the underlying in ‡ationary regime, as shown in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) . All this is left for future research.
Further, our analysis of the optimal …scal and monetary stabilization policies strengthens the Benigno and Woodford (2004) argument that the two policy tools should be seen as complements and that the monetary authority should consider the consequences of her actions for the government budget. In this regard, we show that a substantial amount of in ‡ation volatility is indeed desirable to de ‡ate nominal debt and to limit the accumulation of real debt in the long run. Our results thus provide theoretical support to policy-oriented analyses which call for a reversal of debt accumulated in the aftermath of the 2008 …nancial crisis and for a reconsideration of the role of in ‡ation in facilitating debt reductions.
